Reasons to think a human fetus is a person
I believe the defining questions on the issue of abortion are “what is a person,” “when do fetuses become persons,” and “from where do we derive human value?” Contrary to pro-choice advocates, I do not think the essential question on this issue is whether abortion is a mother’s right or not. I am not questioning anyone’s right to autonomy over their own body. Rather, I am encouraging a return to the initial, and most relevant concern of the issue of abortion, namely, whether a human fetus is considered a person or not. If human fetus is a person, then the fetus is not a part of the mother’s body, but a separate entity altogether, and the mother would, therefore, hold no moral entitlement to abortion should she so desire. I will not address cases where the mother’s life is in danger due to pregnancy.
So first, we must establish whether a fetus is a person or not. If it could be demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt that a fetus is not a person, then the rights of the mother would be a relevant discussion point. However, there is no consensus among scientists, bioethicists, or philosophers that a human fetus is not a person and does not possess moral status. To dismiss the debate on personhood and assume that fetuses are not persons is grossly premature and disregards evidence that suggests otherwise.
There is a fundamental, moral distinction between a healthy three month-old fetus and a healthy, newborn child. In Canada, it is morally acceptable to abort a three month-old fetus. But to abort a healthy newborn child for the same reasons as aborting a healthy three month-old fetus, namely, because the child is not wanted (for whatever reason), is not merely abortion but murder – a morally reprehensible act. So what is the cause of this moral distinction between a three month-old fetus and a newborn child? What difference is there between these two stages of development that would result in the acquisition of personhood and moral status for the newborn, but not the fetus?
The pro-choice advocate must demonstrate, not merely assert, that a three-month old fetus is not a person, and therefore does not possess any moral status. But there seems to be little grounds for such a distinction on their view. Physically, there is no difference which occurs between the fetus stage and the newborn stage, which could adequately account for personhood and moral status in a newborn child.
Physically, a fetus will change throughout its development in the womb. But at the newborn stage, there is nothing new that constitutes the organism that was absent during the fetus stage, which can account for the acquisition of personhood and moral status to the newborn. What is there at birth is the same as what was there at three months in the womb, or at conception for that matter, namely, human cells. The quantity, organization, and function of these cells will change. But these are biological processes that are no more unique to a human fetus than a pig fetus or a dog fetus. Every mammalian creature undergoes a similar development process, and every mammalian creature at birth has little cognitive capacity except for that designated for eating and sleeping. Yet we do not consider any other new-born mammal a person in the human sense, and somehow the pro-choice advocate recognizes that a new-born child is a person, whereas several months earlier they were not.
So, choosing any point in the process to confer personhood would be purely arbitrary. If nothing during the physical process of fetal development can account for personhood, then that which constitutes personhood cannot be anything physical, i.e. related to or originating from physical, biological causes or processes during fetal development. A physical process (fetal development) cannot give rise to properties that are non-physical, i.e. human value, personhood, and moral status. It would appear that what can adequately account for the acquisition of personhood, value, and moral status by a human-being must be derived from some immaterial, transcendent source, entirely apart from persons themselves, and it must be the case that this value is present either from the moment of conception, or not at all.
Now, if human value is to mean anything, it cannot be given by the state, derived from culture, be acquired by virtue of being a member of the human species, or by a person’s utility to society. If value is granted on these grounds, then it can be taken away on these grounds. Furthermore, a value-theory derived from a person’s cognitive or intellectual capacity by virtue of being a member of the human species would result in a society of extremes, characterized by strong divisions along fault lines of perceived intellectual worth. The Atlantic Slave Trade and the Holocaust come to mind. Conversely, if value is intrinsic then it must be immaterial and must be grounded in something separate from or transcendent of humanity. I believe evidence for this claim would be warranted if certain objective moral values were to exist.
If human beings do have intrinsic value, which is not derived from anything physical or pertaining to human culture and society, then it would follow that certain acts among people would deface this value, thereby making those acts universally morally reprehensible. Rape and murder are two examples of acts which disregard the inherent value of other persons, and are done for the pure gratification of the individual(s) committing the act. It seems clear from our moral experience that these actions are inherently, morally wrong – not just social taboos resultant from evolutionary processes. The existence of such objective moral values would provide a sound basis for the inherent intrinsic value of persons, and be able to adequately account for the acquisition of personhood and moral status at birth.